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THE CONTROL OF LARGE-SCALE CIVIL CONFLICTS IN DEMOCRATIC NIGERIA
A fundamental challenge to democracy in Nigeria, or any other country with such deep and volatile ethnic divisions, is to find means for managing, containing and reducing ethnic conflict. The polarization of ethnic and regional conflict was a leading factor in the collapse of Nigeria's First Republic and a central concern in the design of the Second Republic This SRP argues that large-scale civil conflicts constitute a major obstacle towards any meaningful development in Nigeria. Too many lives and property have been lost in these conflicts, and the resulting insecure environment is discouraging many local and international investors. The government's efforts to control these conflicts have not been effective, judging from their alarming recurrence across the country. The most prominent of these civil conflicts are triggered by ethnic and religious issues. The root causes of these conflicts will be identified.
This SRP will analyze the tendency of the government to always react to these conflicts, instead of being pro-active. The Nigeria Police Force's (whose constitutional role it is to maintain law and order) seeming inability to control these conflicts will also be analyzed. The military, attempting to restore law and order, has sometimes been criticized for use of excessive force and exacerbating the conflicts, rather than solving them. The reasons for this will be analyzed.
The SRP concludes with useful suggestions for lasting solutions.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In spite of enormous investments to ensure the protection of life and property in the country, Nigerian ethnic violence has continued unabated. Most experts have agreed that cultural identity, economic factors and politics are contributors to ethnic conflict. In most cases, economic competition between sectors of the urban community takes the outward shape of violent ethnic conflict. 7 Since this competition for scarce economic resources has resulted in conflicts that seem to have overwhelmed the police, it is necessary to find answers to some crucial questions.
The root causes and nature of large-scale civil conflicts in the country must be identified.
Are there signs of impending crisis? How does the government react to such signs? The role of the police in controlling the conflicts should be carefully reviewed. Are the organization and numbers of police adequate for the role assigned to them? Do they have the proper training and equipment for effective control? Are they adequately funded? What is the relationship between the police and other security agencies? How supportive is the relationship between the police and the public? The role of the military in conflict resolution also needs some detailed analysis.
Is there a proper procedure for handing over operations from the police to the military? Is military training designed for control of civil conflicts? Are there adequate rules of engagement and use of minimum force? This SRP addresses these perplexing questions.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
This project will identify the deep causes of the violent civil conflicts that have plagued Nigeria in its recent history. These include the struggle for resources to improve the quality of life of the people. The combatants also clamor for more equitable distribution of the mineral resources, especially when exploitation of minerals seems to worsen the Nigerian environment.
The seeming inability of the government to nip the conflicts in the bud, in spite of reliable indicators of impending violence will also be examined. The failure of the police to control the conflicts requires some investigation, since the police have been overwhelmed in each of the major civil crises. The size, organization, equipment, and training of the police will be reviewed.
After the police are rendered incapable of controlling conflicts, the military are called in to restore law and order. However, the introduction of the military in many cases has been criticized because of soldiers' failure to adhere to the principle of minimum force. This issue needs to be scrutinized as well. The training and orientation of the military for dealing with civil conflicts will be the focus of the study. Three case studies from Kaduna, Benue, and Bayelsa contribute to the analysis. Concluding suggestions will be made for effective control of such civil conflicts in the future.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This SRP will be a useful addition to existing knowledge on the maintenance of law and order in general, and especially on control of large-scale civil conflicts in Nigeria. The SRP will provide some reference for other researchers and also serve as a useful guide to the government and the citizenry in the control of large-scale civil conflicts.
SCOPE
This project will consider the control of conflict for the period 1999 to date. During this democratic period, the rule of law was generally respected and the political leaders were mindful of the reaction of the electorates, unlike military governments which were not answerable to any electorate. Time constraints will not allow a wider research to other periods.
METHODOLOGY
This study adopted a descriptive and analytical method. The sources of data for the study were primary and secondary. Primary data were collected through interviews and questionnaires. Individuals interviewed or served questionnaires included former commanders of operations charged with controlling the conflicts and officers serving in the Nigerian Armed Forces (senior and junior)
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CONFLICT IN GENERAL
The term "conflict" is derived from the Latin word "confligere", which means "to strike together". Conflict represents a condition of dissension in an interaction between two or more parties. Technically, the word could simply be defined as "opposition among social entities directed against one another"
8
. Opposition, as used in this case, merely refers to very little or total lack of cooperation. Conflict is a normal feature in human relations -natural and inevitable.
It is not the contact between ethnic groups that in itself breeds inter-group conflicts, but the intensity of competing claims among the groups. 9 To some people, conflicts are not necessarily bad or dysfunctional. In fact, some claim that conflict is a critical mechanism by which goals and aspirations of individuals and groups are articulated; it is a channel for the definition of creative solutions to human problems and a means to the development of a collective identity.
10
According to Efeovbokhan, stability in government recognizes the presence of conflicts in the political process, so it may therefore be regarded as the ability of a system to resist internal and external pressures, contain and resolve conflicts which are constant phenomena in any polity
11
.
To others, conflict is an abnormal phenomenon which should be avoided at all costs.
Thus it can be seen that conflicts may be positive or negative, constructive or destructive, orderly or disorderly. This study will concentrate on the negative ones. They are said to be destructive when the manifest violence exceeds the threshold defined by societal consensus. In this case, the process of conflict escalation culminates in mutual attacks and efforts to destroy opponents. Misjudgment, misperception, and situational entrapment often unduly magnify. Such a situation endangers human survival as well as social and political structure
12
,. These conflicts usually occur as a result of a clash of interests between parties involved in some form of relationship, either because they are pursuing incompatible goals or they are using incompatible means in the pursuit of their chosen goals
13
. exhausting their resources without any progress) realize the futility of continuing with the conflict. The beauty of this kind of resolution is that it tends to be more enduring more than the others since the solution was achieved by mutual agreement. By 1980, it was evident that economic progress in much of Africa had stalled or had been replaced by economic decline. Production in agriculture and industry was slowing. Per capita incomes were stagnant or falling. The value of exports was declining, while the cost of imports was increasing. In a growing number of countries, foreign debts became so large as to be unserviceable.
MAIN CAUSES OF CIVIL CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA
POVERTY
17
The situation has only worsened since this assessment was given in 1993. Lack of basic essentials for decent living makes many in the society susceptible to being lured into violence by the relatively well-off politicians to prove their relevance and force the government to patronize them. Unfortunately, the implementation of IMF-prescribed Structural Adjustment
Program, coupled with the crippling governmental debt, has significantly reduced public spending on crucial areas of the economy. The current government's attempts to reorder the old inefficient method of allocating resources and to reduce corruption are being strongly opposed by the previously favored groups, who are in turn threatening to cause unrest if the previous favorable (to them) arrangement is changed. Much recent civil unrest is due to the clamor for more equitable resource allocation.
EDUCATION
The literacy rate in Nigeria is about 57.10%
18
. The majority of the citizens live in the rural areas and are mostly illiterate. Thus it is quite easy for these citizens to be misled and mobilized to "defend" their rights, even though, in some cases, some of their grievances may be in the process of being addressed by the government. The July 8, 2002 blockade of a Chevron oil rig by some rural women threatening to strip themselves naked if the oil company failed to grant the community some special concessions is a classic case of mobilization of mainly illiterate folks.
19
Though the leader of this group is a member of the National Assembly (Congress Woman) and very educated, most of the demonstrating women had no clue about the issues at stake except what the politician told them. Education is free up to high school in Nigeria, but some parents still need to be persuaded to send their children to school because they don't know the value of education. Also, they would rather take the children to the farm or to hawk wares to assist in sustaining the family. This lack of education makes it difficult for the illiterate people to understand the system of governance or to know what is expected of them as citizens. They are thus easy to be misled by any unscrupulous politician into violent conflicts which may not be justifiable.
POLITICS OF HORIZONTAL REVENUE SHARING
In Nigeria, federally-generated revenues are distributed to the states and local governments for administration and for the provision of goods and services using some ever changing formulas. Nigeria's form of federalism gives so much power to the center where the bulk of the nation's wealth is held that the other strata of government depend on the central government for most of their functions and in some cases even to pay salaries. Sub-national authorities handle local taxes, but these have no macroeconomic effects on the country. On the other hand, the federal government handles the lucrative taxes from imports, customs, excises, business and mining. The states generate very little revenue. So rather than being a supplemental source of revenue for weak states, funds from the center are the major source of funding for state and local governments. The struggle for larger shares of the revenue by the states and local communities has been a major cause of many civil conflicts in the country.
Various principles have been developed for revenue-sharing from the central government to the states, none of which has enjoyed national acceptance. The two broad categories of principles are efficiency and equity
20
. Efficiency principles focus on rationally distributing revenues to the most economically efficient units, using such criteria like fiscal efficiency, tax efforts, or derivation. Equity principles focus on explicitly political grounds like equal development, national interest, or national minimum standards. In reality, the Nigerian Government seems to have elevated equity over efficiency principles, though the government claims that both are being used. The Population Density  -----10   Total  100  100  100  100  100  100   TABLE 1 As shown above, the major criteria used are equality of the states and population. In spite of the apparent advantages of equality, and the simplicity in the application of this factor, some obvious disadvantages make the principle difficult to defend
24
. Moreover, the principle tends to encourage indolence in some state apparatus. Emphasis placed on this principle has fueled the unending clamor for the creation of new states in the country whether viable or not. 40%   TABLE 2 The government has promised to hold another census next year. The challenge is how to make it acceptable to all Nigerians. The United Nations may have to be invited to supervise the census process to confer legitimacy, remove doubts, and thus remove a source of conflicts.
DERIVATION
The principle of derivation, which seems to have internationalized the ethnic conflict situation in Nigeria more than the other principles, holds that a sizeable percentage of the revenue obtained from minerals must be ploughed back into the community where the minerals came from. This fund is intended to be used for the development of the area and to compensate for the environmental degradation of the community resulting from the exploitation of the minerals. Protests about the refusal of the federal government to increase the weight assigned to this principle and also the failure to apply the principle to the letter eventually led to the execution in November 1995 of internationally recognized leader and novelist Ken Saro-Wiwa from the Ogoni ethnic group of the oil-rich Niger Delta
27
. The ethnic group led by him in their violent protest against the government had killed eight prominent elders of their own ethnic group for being stooges of the government in the exploitation of the community. They also vowed to prevent oil companies from drilling for oil in their area. The military regime arrested, tried, convicted, and executed Mr. Wiwa and eight others for the offence, even while appeals for clemency were still coming from within and also from the international arena.
As expected, the non oil-producing areas strongly oppose the use of this principle for obvious reasons. As a result of lack of consensus, the proportion of oil revenues allocated on a derivation basis steadily declined from 50% of mining rents in 1969, through 2% of the Federation Account in 1981 to 1% from 1989-1999. 28 Only in the year 2000 was the percentage increased to 13%. The tempo of the protest has reduced for now. A constant review of this percentage in view of economic realities will subdue conflicts in the area.
LAND MASS AND TERRAIN
The Land Mass and Terrain principle was championed by politicians from the north, which contains about 70% of the land mass of Nigeria and the South-South people, who inhabit the swampy terrain of the Niger Delta. This principle holds that these areas require more resources to develop than other urbanized areas. The southern states strongly opposed the surreptitious introduction of this principle in 1990 by the military government of Ibrahim Babangida. So great was the opposition that rather than remove it completely, the percentage allocated to land mass and terrain was reduced to five per cent each. Since 1990, the three terrain types recognized under this principle are wetlands (i.e. the swamps of the Delta), the plains and the highlands. 29 This principle has been so controversial that an expert has suggested that "either the use of the principle should be suspended or the weight assigned to it generally reduced".
30
POPULATION DENSITY
To further complicate the politicization of population data in the country and to assuage the vehement southern opposition to the Land Mass and Terrain principle, which obviously favored the north, the principle of population density which obviously favored the south, was sponsored during the 1994-95 National Constitutional Conference. This principle holds that the densely populated areas actually need more resources to provide goods and services for the citizens. To balance this delicate political and economic equation, the same 10% (as in Land
Mass and Terrain principle) was allocated to the principle of population density.
INTERNAL REVENUE GENERATION
Most of the revenue allocation commissions in the country since the 1950's had always recommended that the government must encourage autonomous revenue generation, independent of funds coming from the federal government, which the states should then regard as supplements. Unfortunately, these recommendations were always ignored. However, there is a consensus among the elite that this principle should be incorporated into Nigeria's revenuesharing scheme. In 1981, this principle was assigned 5%. The 1989 NRMASFC recommended 20%, but this was cut to 10% in favor of the land mass and terrain principle
31
. This percentage is still in force. The greatest opposition to this principle is from the relatively economically backward states in the north. The second problem militating against the principle is the dearth of reliable data on which to base the revenue generation calculation. As a compromise, the calculation is based on the percentage increase in revenue generation of a given year over the previous year.
32
The direct administration of the Federation Account by the federal government is the main problem threatening the peaceful process of revenue sharing in the country. Each succeeding government appoints ad hoc commissions to attend to protests and receive recommendations from various quarters regarding revenue mobilization and fiscal control. A permanent commission made up of seasoned bureaucrats could subject this fire brigade approach to critical analysis and fashion an enduring system that will be acceptable to most
Nigerians. . The government needs to be more proactive in intelligence gathering. It also needs to coordinate the active participation of the corporate bodies in the area, traditional rulers and eminent personalities and a friendly, wellequipped police to identify a brewing conflict and prevent it from escalating into a major conflict.
CONTROL OF LARGE-SCALE CIVIL CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA
A virile and truly independent judiciary is essential to enforce the law of the land regarding any violation in the maintenance of peace and harmonious co-existence.
POLICE EFFORTS IN CONTROLLING CIVIL CONFLICTS
After the outbreak of a civil conflict, combatants from both sides always claim to have good will in their desire to live in harmony with their neighbors. Even if such claim were sincere, Donald Horowitz asserted that good will was inadequate to address complex issues " good will alone… would not suffice to cope with ethnic conflict, for it is the product of forces independent of individual good will. Deliberate measures were required 
35
. This constitutional responsibility is further explicated in Section 4 of the Police Act Cap 359 as follows:
• The prevention and detection of crime.
• The apprehension of offenders.
• The preservation of law and order.
• The protection of life and property.
• The enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, as well as performance of such duties within and outside Nigeria as may be required of them
36
Other enactments under various acts of the National Assembly promulgated under the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria enable the NPF to efficiently carry out its duties to maintain law and order. In order to carry out these duties, the NPF is organized into eight zones as shown in the The total strength of the NPF was 100,000 as at January 1999
37
. For a population of 127m, this gives a ratio of one policeman to every 1,270 citizens, in contrast to the desired United Nations ratio of one policeman to 400 citizens. Each of the eight zones is headed by an Assistant Inspector General (AIG) of police. Each state has a Commissioner of Police (CP) in charge of all police duties. Altogether, the police are organized into about 4,137 formations, which is by far the widest coverage in the country by any national establishment. Though there is a provision for policemen in almost every town, the extremely low strength of the NPF does not meet this provision. Policemen are thus seldom seen outside the big cities. In an apparent acknowledgement of this gross deficiency, the government has made some arrangements to recruit 15,000 fresh policemen annually for the next 5 years. Assuming this plan succeeds, even without counting normal attrition, the strength by 2007 will be 175,000, which is still far short of the UN target.
Even with the current strength, the training curriculum of the NPF needs a complete overhaul. This is because police performance is far below expectations. The minimum educational standard for enlisted men at entry must be rigidly fixed at high school diploma whereas some police are currently stark illiterates. Officer cadets should have a minimum of a college degree in addition to other qualifications. Police training should incorporate the essentials of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, encourage better relationships with the public, and stress the need to be less brutal in handling civil disturbances. The extreme brutality of the anti-riot police in the control the past conflicts earned them the nick-name of "kill and go". Police training should also aim at reducing the current psychological distance between the NPF and the public. The people don't view the police as friends; and frequently, those who volunteer information to assist in on-going investigations end up as suspects. According to the incumbent Inspector General of Police, relatives of suspects are sometimes held against their will until the suspects are produced. He further admitted that "the wider the police-public (psychological) distance, the more difficult is the task of maintenance law and order in any society 40 . The NPF leadership must therefore take part in seminars, symposia, and workshops together with the broad spectrum of the society for better understanding of what is expected of them and the best approach towards achieving these expectation. There is no substitute for a well trained, well mannered, and well-led police force in the control of large-scale civil conflicts.
Good rapport with the locals is essential for effective control of undesirable elements in the society. Alfred Denning, a respected British lawyer described the British Police thus "Young men of excellent character from good homes…who, without knowing it have born in them a sense of fair play and calmness in emergency and a respect for law and order, well trained and well In an era when criminal groups possess sophisticated weapons, radios, and other communications equipment, the NPF as presently equipped cannot effectively control any largescale conflicts, especially when these conflicts become violent and destructive.
As part of the complete training and retraining package, policing methods also need to reform. Presently, a majority of the policemen use foot patrols, and static check-points along the highways to control conflicts. In major cities where vehicles are available, motorized patrol, stopand-search (on individuals) and the 'Aberdeen' Patrol System has been adopted. According to the Aberdeen system, vehicles drop groups of four to five policemen in crisis-prone areas while the vehicle goes for another assignment. These groups then patrol the areas on foot seeking trouble makers and seizing incriminating items before the vehicle returns to pick them for a repeat performance in other areas.
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Police information-gathering techniques are mostly reactive. If conflicts are to be prevented, the NPF must adopt proactive techniques to nip the crises in the bud, rather than wait for them to be fully blown before trying to control them. Modern methods must replace the obsolete colonial system of information gathering and processing. The police should link up with other security agencies and the traditional leaders of the various communities to share information on any simmering conflict. Even with the recommended injection of funds for the information gathering equipment, but without the cooperation of other security agencies, police performance may not justify the investment.
The high-handedness of the police and crass corruption across the rank and file are major obstacles. They must be removed if the public confidence which is crucial for police operations, is to be restored. Police corruption has been so institutionalized that policemen at road blocks set up ostensibly to verify vehicle documents even give change to hapless drivers who cannot come up with the exact bribery amount demanded Nigerian populace has little respect for the police, due to their ineffectiveness and venality .
Ethnic tensions have escalated into major confrontations, fanned rather than reduced by inept steps by the police. 46 . Thus the necessary exchange of information between the services is almost completely lacking. Since security is the business of all, there is a need for closer cooperation between NPF and other services especially concerning brewing conflicts. Also, a smooth process is needed to integrate the military, when needed, into police efforts to alleviate conflicts and thus restore law and order.
MILITARY EFFORTS TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER
Under the present arrangement, once the NPF is unable to maintain law and order-either because of inadequate equipment, or the sophistication of the ensuing violence in the conflict or the extent of the area in conflict-a procedure is initiated whereby the military will be called out to Failure to achieve this balance through timely issue of appropriate rules of engagement will lead to excessive use of force, which in turn can damage the legitimacy of the military and even enhance the legitimacy of the combatants in the conflict. For instance, the alleged sacking of a whole village, as will be seen in the selected case studies, has little to do with arresting a few criminal elements in a particular community.
The Nigerian military is just emerging from almost two decades of unbroken military rule during which might was almost accepted to be right. The accurate general public perception is that, because the military was not accountable to any electorate, they committed many acts of abuse during the military regimes. Therefore, without any thorough reorientation and retraining about rules of engagement when dealing with fellow citizens, the military is likely to act as "usual," with the same brutal effects characteristic of the military era.
Similarly, the lack of serious and sincere after-action appraisals and failure to hold erring officers accountable also encourages troops to be tempted to ignore their mandate. Following the introduction of the Shari'a system of administration in nearby Zamfara state, the Muslims in Kaduna demanded the same system, which they saw as the only way out of the corruption, greed, and injustice that was leading them to hopelessness
51
. A bill to this effect was presented to the state Assembly. While it was still being processed, the Muslims planned a solidarity rally for December 1999 to drum up support for the system. When intelligence about the simmering crisis was shared with the Acting Governor, he did not appreciate the urgency of the conflict and failed to take appropriate action until the crisis was fully blown In order to prevent a recurrence of similar religious conflicts in the future, the state government boldly moved to address the core grievances of the conflict, which was the introduction of the Sharia law. This law will apply only in areas where Muslims are in majority.
Some of the issues of marginalization are being addressed both at the state and the federal levels. . It was also confirmed that by the time the soldiers left, only a church, a community center, and a bank were left standing.
Everything else was destroyed. . This led to the loss of five soldiers trying to remove an unmanned road block at the entrance to the town. The soldiers had to carry out anti-ambush operations before dislodging them from the positions. It is thus possible that the loss of the soldiers so early in the operation infuriated them, causing them to declare the whole area hostile. To some experts, the soldiers simply exceeded their mandates in unleashing such terrible destruction on fellow citizens whose taxes are used to maintain the military. To others, Odi was a deliberate and premeditated plan by the government to use scorched-earth policy to annihilate the people in order to make things easy for the oil companies. 66 Thus it was categorized as genocide on the part of the government. Some even declared that the iron fist approach of the soldiers was designed to
show that in any combat against any militant group in the society (natural or supernatural), the military will always be the winner. This would discourage any other group from "challenging" the supremacy of the military
67
. A consensus emerged that the military used excessive force to achieve their objective in Odi. This was emphatically advanced by Senator Ajadi of the National Assembly, Abuja who cited it as a case of "hitting an ant with a sledgehammer"
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A senior Nigerian military officer, admits "There is a need to strictly adhere to the use of minimum force, more so, as use of force by the security forces on fellow citizens would always be painstakingly scrutinized by various interests. Above all, the work of the security forces is to contain the conflicts and not to be a party to them"
69
. The rules of engagements must be reviewed to put more emphasis on restraint than is normally practiced in conventional war.
Moreover, detailed after-action appraisals must be followed by prosecution for any established cases of abuse through the normal legal procedures laid down in the Constitution. The Tivs feel that having been on the land for over a century, they qualify to be the rightful owners of the land on which they farm. They advocate partitioning of the land so that the cattle herdsmen will avoid damaging their farm land. A good political system with effective leaders determines the ways that violent conflicts are constructively prevented. 74 Based on this criterion, the Nigerian Government has not measured up to expectation because most of the conflicts are not prevented but poorly controlled after they have already broken out. The major causes of Nigerian civil conflicts were enumerated in the paper. Fundamentally, the federalist structure in the country needs some adjustment. The percentage of the federally-generated revenue being held at the center needs to be cut to a maximum of 20% in favor of the states and local governments. The principles of horizontal sharing of revenue to the states should be reviewed to encourage the states to raise internally generated revenues. The three problems besetting revenue sharing in the country are disproportionate percentage of the federally collected revenue; the unfulfilled quest for an acceptable, rational, and equitable formula for horizontal revenue sharing among states; and the absence of a permanent institution for the management of the revenue-sharing system in the country.
All the above measures can be successfully monitored only by a truly fiscally independent judiciary and fiscal administrative establishment. The major cause of large-scale civil conflicts, according to the research, is citizens' competition for scarce resources. The present practice of ad hoc fiscal administrative bodies set up by each government has simply worsened the situation since these bodies merely attend to the interest of the government of the day by using spurious and indefensible principles to share the revenues. These principles have never enjoyed national acceptance. With no other avenue to express themselves, the citizens tend to take laws into their hands through violent civil disturbances to seek redress.
It is the constitutional duty of the Nigeria Police Force to maintain law and order. President
Obasanjo said he is committed to make the police more effective and to promote internal security through proactive intelligence and to reduce tension in the country Public hearings should be held after any call-out of the military to restore law and order; officers found guilty of abuse or of brutal acts should be punished according to the law of the land. Similarly, the recommendations of commissions of enquiry established to investigate circumstances surrounding the outbreak of any violent civil conflict should be implemented. For instance, if confirmed ring leaders of the violent conflict are punished according to the law of the land, future trouble-makers will be deterred. According to a respected religious leader in the country, the blame for the persistent crises resides solely with the government for failing to punish perpetrators of such conflict as a way of discouraging future participants
76
. The alarming frequency of these conflicts also underscores this fact. If all the above measures are seriously followed, the incessant outbreak of violent crises with the attendant loss of life and property will be reduced to the barest minimum. Only then will Nigeria begin to develop its potential for stability and properity.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to effectively control the spate of large-scale civil conflicts in Nigeria, it is recommended that:
• The Federal Government set up a permanent Fiscal Administrative Organization (FAO) by an act of the National Assembly.
• The structure of the Nigerian Federalism must be adjusted to reduce the percentage of federal revenue held at the center to a maximum of 20%.
• The principles used for sharing revenue with the states should be modified by the new FAO to encourage states to increase internal revenue generation.
• The Federal Government must fund renewed training, with equipment, and more enlightened orientation of the police.
• The bulk of the corrupt policemen must be weeded out -younger, better educated and psychologically sound candidates must be recruited.
• The Nigerian military must be retrained on the proper handling of fellow citizens when restoring law and order.
• Public hearings must be held after any military call-out to identify any excessive use of force or other abuses.
• Military officers convicted of excessive use of force or other gross abuses as well as confirmed leaders of violent crises should be punished according to the law of the land.
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